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ULRICH K. PREUSS
Perspectives on Post-Conflict
Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime
Change Through External
Constitutionalization
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Ulrich K. Preuss is Professor of Law and Politics at the Hertic School of Govern-
ance, Berlin and Judge at the Constitutional Court of the Land Bremen. He has worked on the constitutional
transition in the post-communist states of East and Central Europe, the development of a European constitu-
tion, in particular on the concept of European citizenship, and on the relations between liberal constitutionalism
and the multicultural society. His present research focuses on questions of the constitutionalization of interna-
tional law. Among his recent works are CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND PROGRESS (1995); INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE
SHIP AT SEA (co-authored with Jon Elster and Claus Offe) (1998), and EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP, MULTICUL
TURALISM AND THE STATE (Ulrich K. Preuss & Ferran Requejo eds., 1998). His most recent book, KRIEG
VERBRECHEN BLASPHEMIE: OBER DEN WANDEL BEWAFFNETER GEWALT (2d ed. 2003), deals with the legal
and moral questions of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the role of the United States in international
politics.
I. INTRODUCTION: SELF-DETERMINATION AND IMPOSED FREEDOM
In the relatively short history of modern constitutionalism, constitution-
making has been an act of political liberation from regimes whose legitimacy had
been compromised. True, there were exceptions. In 19th century Germany dur-
ing the constitutional struggles between the monarchy and democratic forces, con-
stitutions were periodically imposed by an autocratic monarch.' But after the
universal triumph of the principle of popular sovereignty in the decades after
World War II, today the normative force of constitutions rests upon the constitu-
ent power of the people.2 Constitution-making has been tantamount to a people's
aspiration to disrupt the continuity of their political system and to found a new
polity.3 Until recently, this seemed to be an axiom of political philosophy and
constitutional theory. However, this view has now been placed into question by
the emergence of constitutions which do not originate from, or pay little regard to,
the constituent power of the people.
Two instances come to mind. The first is the transformation of the formerly
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe through revolutions4 involv-
ing some kind of constitution-making.5 What strikes the student of modern con-
stitutional history as remarkable is the "notable absence of constitutional
constituent assemblies,"6 or any other kind of constituent power. These transfor-
mations may give rise to a new variety of constitutionalism characteristic of soci-
eties in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, which one could term
"constitutionalism of transition."7 The second instance is coerced regime change
from outside through the imposition not just of new rulers, but of a constitution
aimed at sustaining the more or less violent conversion of an autocratic regime to
a democratic system. The obvious case is Iraq where the United States, after the
military defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime, established an interim constitu-
tion, soon followed by a constitution drafted by Iraqi political forces under the
auspices of the Americans.8 The inauguration of democratic constitutions in Ger-
many and Japan after World War II by the Western Allies and the Americans,
1. 2 E.R. HUBER, DEtrfscHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICIITE SErr 1789, at 763 (2d ed. 1968); 3 E.R. HUBER,
DEUTSCIHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHIClrTE SEIT 1789, at 11, 29, 35.
2. See THE PARADOX OP CONSTII'UTIONALSM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., forthcoming June
2007).
3. Cf BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 14, 46 (1992) (discussing constitution-
making as the top priority in a revolutionary situation); see also ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLtrPION: TIIE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 81-89 (Deborah Lucas
Schneider trans., 1995).
4. See ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND LEGITIMACY 81-129 (2000).
5. JON ELSTER ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: REBUILDING THE SHIP
AT SEA 63-108 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 1998).
6. Ruti Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transnational Perspective, 26 COLUM. Hum.
RTS. L. REv. 167, 172 (1994).
7. See id.; Ruti Teitel, TransnationalRule of Law, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAwAFTER COMMU-
NISM 279 (Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005).
8. See Andrew Arato, Interim Imposition, 18 ETHICS & INT'l, App. 25, 36 (2004).
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respectively, 9 is largely seen as the historical precedent of what one may call het-
eronomous constitutionalism.
This article addresses the question of whether we are currently witnessing
modes of nation-building or regime change in which the connection between pop-
ular self-determination and constitution-making is dissolved or at least signifi-
cantlyloosened. This article will proceed in the following steps: Part II contains
a brief discussion of the ambiguous relationship between constitution-making and
political freedom, and addresses the question of whether heteronomous constitu-
tions can be legitimized. Part III describes a relevant case study, the history of
the German Basic Law, which was inspired by the three Western Allies after
they defeated and occupied Germany. Part IV discusses which societal precondi-
tions must be met for an imported constitution to be compatible with the receiv-
ing social structure of a particular country and become the accepted normative
foundation of the polity. Amongst numerous preconditions, two will be examined
more closely, the first being statehood and secularization and the second being
ethnic and religious homogeneity. In Part V, this article will scrutinize the role
of the international community as an external actor in the creation of new consti-
tutions for conflict-ridden societies and ask whether it is justified to speak of an
emerging paradigm of constitutional interventionism. Finally, Part VI will con-
clude with a brief summary of why regime change through the coercive trans-
plantation of constitutions is a promising venture.
II. HETERONOMOUS CONSTITUTIONS?
Heteronomous constitutions seem possible if one reconsiders the connection
between constitutionalism and autonomy. In the history of modern constitution-
alism, constitutions have always been considered the embodiment of a people's
self-determination as expressed by its constituent power. Constitutions are the
product of severe conflict in society. Even constitutions following the paradigm of
constitutionalism of transition, and its inherent tendency towards legal con-
tinuity, 10 have not been created in times of political routine. Constitutions are
symbols of a new political beginning after the past order has been brought to an
end in a more or less violent and abrupt manner. In a socio-political perspective,
constitutions can be regarded as a ceasefire agreement or a peace treaty between
social forces struggling for power in a polity. Constitutions come into being after
a revolution or war, but in either case the people are deeply involved. After a
9. See Nevil Johnson, Constitutionalism in Europe Since 1945: Reconstruction and Reappraisal, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 26 (Douglas
Greenberg et al. eds., 2001); Hideo Otake, Two Contrasting Constitutions in the Postwar World: The
Making of the Japanese and West German Constitutions, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONAL-
LSM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY- 43 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); see also PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF
THEWEsT GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963) (detailing the specifics of the German case).
10. See ARATO, supra note 4, at 171.
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revolution - the most intense kind of internal social conflict - the triumphant
forces lay out their principles of how society should be ordered. This is tanta-
mount to imposing their rule upon the defeated groups who are then usually
denounced as "counter-revolutionary," "reactionary," or sometimes even as "ene-
mies of the people." Constitution-making after a war is not very different. If the
war was lost, then the demoralized masses place the blame for their defeat and
sufferings on the now "old regime," which has proved itself unable to defend the
essential interests of the nation. They throw their rulers out of office and the
desire for a new beginning manifests with the demand for a new constitution
expected to reflect their needs, hopes, and aspirations." But even after a victori-
ous war, a new distribution of power, i.e. a new constitution, is on the agenda of
the nation. The people want recognition and remuneration for their sacrifices
and hence demand a new distribution of the benefits of the social compact.' 2
If constitution-making is a phenomenon of citizens' activation, then the idea
of imposing a constitution upon a nation appears odd and incoherent. Imposition
means degrading the people to a thoroughly passive and subaltern status which is
exactly what constitutionalism is supposed to overcome in the first place. 13 On
the other hand, we must not forget that since its historical breakthrough at the
end of the 18th century, modern constitutionalism has been characterized by its
universalist imprint. The invocation of inalienable rights of men in the Ameri-
can and French Revolution demonstrates that the benefit of political freedom -
the core of modem constitutionalism - was not thought to be limited to those
peoples who had been lucky enough to liberate themselves; rather, true freedom
could only be enjoyed if it was shared with all other peoples. This is unmistaka-
bly expressed in the wording of the draft for a resolution of the French National
Assembly written by Deputy Volnay in May 1790:
The Assembly solemnly declares:
1. that it regards the entire mankind as a single and identical society
whose goal is the peace and the happiness of all and every single of
its members;
2. ...
3. ... that, consequently, no people has the right to take possession of
the property of another people or to deprive it of its freedom and its
natural advantages;
4. that every war fought for another motive or purpose but the de-
fence of a just cause is an act of oppression which every great soci-
11. This pattern surfaced in Germany after World War I and in France after World War II and reemerged in
the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.
12. The British welfare state set up by the Labour government after World War II is an obvious example.
13. See Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN T14E CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3, 9 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993); see also PREUSS, supra note 3, at 109.
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ety has to stand up against because one state's invasion of another
one tends to menace the freedom and security of all. 14
This principle did not prohibit the use of force to liberate a people living under
the rule of a tyrant. Freedom was considered a benefit which rightly belonged to
all, and spreading liberty worldwide was considered a service to mankind. On
December 15, 1792, the French Revolutionary Convention expressed this idea in
a "Proclamation to the liberated peoples" in which it solemnly declared:
Friends and Brothers, we have conquered liberty, and we shall main-
tain it. We offer you the enjoyment of this inestimable benefit which
has always been our right, and of which our oppressors have not been
able to deprive us except by crime. We have chased away your tyrants;
show yourselves to be free men, and we will guarantee you from their
vengeance, their projects and their return .... 15
What follows are the declarations of the French Revolution, using almost the
same language as the preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen of August 26, 1789. In other words, liberty is a universal good which
must not be restricted to a particular nation, moreover, its principles and de-
mands are everywhere the same. In view of this there is no principal difference
between the self-liberation of a people and its liberation through others. Conse-
quently, Bonaparte's crusades, which expanded French domination over almost
the entire European continent and beyond, were wars of liberation through
which he intended to spread the universalist message of the French Revolution
over the "backward countries."
While the universalization of freedom (and constitutionalism, its institu-
tionalized paradigm) promised the liberation of mankind from the evils of op-
pression and tyranny, the realization of this high-spirited project entailed a
major problem: The distinction between imperialism and liberation was blurred,
and this was tantamount to confusing liberty and tyranny. Can we conceive of
the paradox of "imposed freedom?" To liberate a people means to eliminate an
obstacle - for example, an authoritarian ruler - which prevents them from
doing what they could otherwise do. This definition refers to Isaiah Berlin's fa-
mous notion of negative freedom. 16  Negative freedom presupposes that the ob-
stacle is perceived as just that, an obstacle which stands in the way of the actions
which one would otherwise perform. If people regard their rulers as a barrier to
freedom, the removal of this barrier by the army of a benevolent neighbour is an
act of liberation, not of imposition (which presupposes a certain degree of coer-
cion). If the people accept their rulers and do not consider them to be illegitimate,
14. 2 FONTES HISTORIAE IURIS GENTIUM: QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES VOLKERRECHTS 646 (Wilhelm
G. Grewe ed., 1995).
15. Id. at 656.
1 6. Is]AIi BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1970).
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the removal of the rulers by a benevolent third party is not liberation, but the
imposition of a way of living which they did not choose. Thus, "imposed free-
dom" is a contradiction in terms: Either I am liberated in that my ruler who is a
blockage to my freedom is removed - whoever removes it, the result is in accor-
dance with my will and hence not imposed. Or the ruler is removed whom I do
not regard as a barrier to my freedom - the removal may open hitherto un-
available options for me, in any case these options have been created against or at
least without my will; hence they are imposed upon me.
But for some this may seem an overly simplistic criterion of liberty. It is
possible that somebody lives under the rule of an oppressor but does not know
what it means to be free, i.e. to enjoy new options. If so, then a person can only
be free if he is truly autonomous and in full possession of his human capacities,
and therefore capable of distinguishing freedom from enslavement. This is basi-
cally the argument that leads to what Berlin calls positive freedom. The idea of
positive freedom assumes that other persons simply do not know what is good for
them, and we are fully justified in coercing them to accept what we have identi-
fied as valuable, in fact indispensable, to their true Self.17 An example of this
idea is a parent's right and duty to educate his or her children. Viewed as such,
imposing freedom on others is not necessarily self-contradictory.
But imposing a constitution is a different case. Constitutions are complex
devices which presuppose the political majority of the people living under it.
Constitutions impose restraints on the members of a polity by limiting freedom.
But, it is their paradoxical quality that they limit freedom for the sake of increas-
ing freedom, that they are mechanisms of autopaternalism through which the
members of a would-be-polity create the appropriate tools for coping with chal-
lenges and future contingencies. 18 What at first glance appear to be merely lim-
iting and disabling schemes - for instance the separation of powers, the
guarantee of fundamental rights for individuals as insurmountable barriers to
governmental intrusion, or the establishment of constitutional courts and their
authority to review legislative acts - are devices which enable reflection, delib-
eration and collective learning.19 Most importantly, a constitution can play this
enabling role only to the degree that it is a self-binding mechanism. It must be
self-imposed so that its restraining force is seen as a means of achieving freedom,
not incapacitation and bondage. Thus, the liberation of a people cannot occur
through the imposition of a constitution.
If imposing a constitution upon a people is not a reasonable option, then
liberating a people from their oppressors would only make sense if the people
were able to mobilize their own constitution-making capacities. One could hy-
17. Id. at 132.
18. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTiONALISM AND DE-
MOCRACY 195, 235 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
19. Id. at 239.
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pothesize that an oppressed people that have not freed themselves from their op-
pressors do not develop the strong motives and necessary energy to preserve the
bequeathed freedom through the foundational act of constitution-making. John
Stuart Mill might have had this in mind when he argued against intervention
for the sake of a people's liberation. He insisted upon the principle of self-deter-
mination and argued that a people can only enjoy freedom it achieves on its
own. 20 However this may be, we must not equate freedom and constitution-
making. It is one thing to liberate a people by chasing away its rulers; it is quite
a different thing to arrogate the responsibility to give those people a constitution.
This difference does not necessarily mean that constitutions can only come
into being through the constituent power of a free people, although this is cer-
tainly the ideal case. Mill's opinion reflects the liberal view that nations, similar
to individuals, are independent and autonomous actors who are responsible for
themselves and should avoid interfering with the affairs of other (individual or
collective) persons. This view is supported by contemporary public international
law. Article two, paragraph two of the Charter of the United Nations proclaims
the sovereign equality of its members as its basic principle, and paragraph four of
the same article prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state." Any state interference with the inter-
nal affairs of another state is prohibited unless authorized by the U.N. Security
Council or justified by the need for self-defense. Arguably this includes interven-
tions on humanitarian grounds to protect a state's population from injustice. At
least, this appears to be the prevailing opinion among public international law-
yers who regard the domestic affairs of a state, including its constitution, as re-
maining outside the jurisdiction and evaluation of other states.21
But there are other voices, the most prominent being that of the former
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cudllar, who in his
annual report to the General Assembly stated:
[T]he principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdic-
tion of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impu-
nity. The fact that, in diverse situations, the United Nations has not
been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, legal or
moral, against the necessary corrective action, especially where peace is
threatened .... The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity and political independence of States is by itself indubita-
bly strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the
implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the
20. John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in 3 DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS: POLIT-
ICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND HISTORICAL 154 (Kessinger Publ'g 2004) (1873).
21. See, e.g., Albrecht Randelzhofer, Introduction Art. 2, Arts. 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 51 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of deci-
mation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of control-
ling civil strife or insurrection. 22
Scholars of public international law and practitioners alike have echoed this
assessment. 23 Some go a step further and re-conceptualize the idea of sovereignty.
They claim that the principle of sovereignty in public international law refers to
the sovereignty of the people, not of the state and its elites. According to this
view, there is an "emerging right to democratic governance" in public interna-
tional law 2 4 which under certain conditions may justify a unilateral armed inter-
vention into the domestic affairs of an undemocratic state; this would be an
intervention against political leaders who are not entitled to the protection of the
country's sovereignty if their leadership is based upon usurpation.25 Other au-
thors are more reluctant, not only because they are aware of the looming danger
of misuse, but because of the danger in advancing this largely procedural concep-
tion of liberal democracy as the genuine model of democracy that could legitimize
imposing foreign rule upon non-Western societies.26 There is an ongoing vibrant
discussion of the problem of constitutionalizing public international law.27
This discussion reflects the undeniable fact of an increased interdependency
of the states increasing the sense of mutual responsibility on a global level.28 Its
implications for constitution-making will be discussed in Part V. It seems appro-
priate here to discuss one paradigmatic case of importing a constitution, namely
the case of West Germany's Basic Law, generated during the period of Allied
occupation after World War II.
III. POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY - NO CASE OF IMPORTED, MUCH LESS
IMPOSED, CONSTITUTIONALISM
President Bush used the case of post-World War II Germany, a paradigm
for the successful constitutionalization of an occupied country, to justify his ad-
ministration's attempt to impose an interim constitution on Iraq after the mili-
22. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 5, deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N.Doc. A/46/1 (Sept, 13, 1991).
23. See, e.g., INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, INT'L DEV. RES. CTR., THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/960-7/.
24. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 46, 46
(1964); see also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tionalLaw, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 240 (Gregory H. Fox &
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
25. See Reisman, supra note 24, at 248-49.
26. See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL. ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw420-25 (1999).
27. Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning ofInternational Constitutional Law, in TowARDsWORLD CONSTI-
TTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THEWORLD COMMUNITY 837-51 (Ronald St. J.
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005).
28. INT'l. COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 23, at 39.
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tary defeat of the Saddam regime.29 In fact, the Basic Law3° originated in the
political will of the Western Allies of World War II who exercised their sovereign
power over the country in the decade between May 1945 and May 1955. The
Basic Law has become the country's most durable constitution in its admittedly
short history as a political nation since 1871. Germany's sovereignty shifted to
the occupying powers (United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain, who co-
opted the Gaullist France a few months later) who jointly assumed the responsi-
bility for the country after the unconditional surrender of the military leadership
of the Nazi regime on May 8, 1945. Some scholars of public international law
argued that the Reich, i.e. Germany as a legal and political entity, had foun-
dered as a result of the war and disappeared from the political landscape alto-
gether.31 However, most authors inside and outside of Germany argued that
Germany as a political entity continued to exist, even though it was unable to
rule itself because the Four Allies had legally undisputed supreme authority.3 2
Under this state of affairs the occupying forces pursued different political goals in
their respective zones which they assigned to themselves after the occupation.
Ultimately, Germany's division into four occupation zones ended in the split be-
tween the "West" and the "Soviet bloc," which dominated world politics until the
breakdown of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.
It was this constellation of world politics that gave rise to the project of a
separate West German state consisting of the three occupation zones of the West-
ern Allies. To understand how the Basic Law was created, it is necessary to
emphasize that despite the ultimate sovereignty of the military commanders in
their respective occupation zones, they still had to involve local German forces to
establish an administration to provide basic services for the population. This
entailed the gradual setting up of German local authorities based upon demo-
cratic elections and finally the formation of states (Lander) with full-fledged con-
stitutions including bills of fundamental rights and rules about the machinery of
government. These Lander constitutions were drafted and enacted by democrat-
ically elected parliaments; moreover, most of them were submitted to plebiscitary
sanction. An integral part of this democratization process had been the licensing
of political parties which occasioned a multi-party system from which only the
forces of the old Nazi system were excluded. All in all, in 1948, the three Western
occupation zones consisted of (at that time twelve) Lander which were ruled by
parliaments and governments that derived their authority from democratic elec-
tions and hence represented the different political forces of the German popula-
tion. However, in a strictly legal sense the peoples in the Lander did not exercise
29. For more on the imposition of the interim constitution in Iraq see Arato, supra note 8.
30. West Germany's constitution until 1990 and the united Germany's constitution since October 3, 1990.
31. E.g., Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 Am. J.
IN'fL L. 518, 518-19 (1945).
32. 1 L.F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 519 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1947).
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their constituent power when they enacted constitutions because the supreme au-
thority, i.e. German sovereignty, was "vested, with full effect in International
Law, either jointly with the four Powers or with any one of them in respect of
the part of German territory placed under its administration."33
In July 1948, the three Western Allies submitted a proposal to the prime
ministers of the West German Lander, suggesting they convene a democratically
elected constituent assembly to create a constitution for a West German state con-
sisting of the three Western occupation zones. The new state would be the prod-
uct of a new constitution. This was an idea which assumed that statehood
originated from constitution-making, and that there is no state beyond and prior
to the constitution - an assumption which is an inherent element of American
constitutional reasoning while it is totally alien to the German constitutional and
state law tradition. 34 The German politicians rejected this plan, not because of
this theoretical argument, but for a strong political reason founded upon that
theoretical argument. They feared that the foundation of a separate West Ger-
man state would petrify the division of Germany into two states - they correctly
anticipated that the Soviet Union would follow suit with the establishment of a
distinct state in their military zone - and sanction the final and irrevocable
dissolution of the political unity of the German nation.35
This refusal of the prime ministers - at that time the only Germans who
could claim to be the legitimate representatives not of the German people, but of
the peoples of the West German Lander - created a paradoxical situation: the
military commanders held the sovereign power in their military zones and could
establish any kind of political regime, both individually in their respective zones
and jointly for the three Western zones. The only option excluded from their
range of possibilities was to create a constituent assembly of the populations of the
German Lander. The obstacle was not erected by public international law. Al-
though the then fresh Charter of the United Nations established the right of self-
determination of peoples, 36 and arguably entailed new limits to the rights of oc-
cupying military forces of a conquering nation, Article 107 of the Charter stipu-
lated certain exceptions at the expense of the "enemy states" Germany and
33. Id. at 520. For the German text see Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Law Gazette] 1990, BGB1. I at 1318.
34. Cf Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, Introduction, Constitutional Crisis: The German and
the American Experience, in WOMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 1, 1-39 (Arthur J. Jacobson &
Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000).
35. For the details see REINHARD MUP3GNUG, Zustandekommen des Grundgesetzes und Entstehen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHITS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEtrrSCi-
I-AND 219-58 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987); Michael Stolleis, Besatzungsherrschaft und
Wiederaujbau deutscher Staatlichkeit 1945-1949, in 1 HANtBUCH DES STATsSRECm'rS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 173-217 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
36. See Karl Doehring, Special Section: Sef-Determination, in 1 TI n,. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY 47-63 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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Japan. 37 Rather, the reason has to do with the very concept of constitutionalism.
The Western Allies' project was essentially a command to the Germans in the
three Western military zones to organize themselves as one people and secede
from the German people as it still legally existed in the German Reich. 38 Here
again the different conceptual premises of the Germans and, in particular, the
Americans came to light. For the American understanding, the will of a multi-
tude to unite under a common constitution is tantamount to creating a nation.
Therefore the Americans found nothing wrong in their bid to those Germans who
had the chance to live under conditions of freedom, to draw the political conse-
quences, and to constitute themselves as "we the people" who are united under a
constitution of freedom. This was not so to the German heads of the Ldnder
governments who, it should be emphasized, embodied the then German demo-
cratic elite, consisting largely of refugees returned from exile, former prisoners of
the Nazi regime, or those who had survived the twelve barbaric years in what
later was called the "internal emigration." Even they, whose democratic creden-
tials were beyond any doubt, insisted on the reality of a German people prior to
the constitution. For them, a constitution which did not recognize the logical
priority of the people as a historical and quasi-existential entity did not fit the
needs of the pre-existing German nation. In fact, it could even jeopardize the
existence of the nation in that it could encourage tendencies towards the secession
of some parts of the country. Thus, it is understandable that the Western Allies'
offer to the West Germans to enact a constitution which would solemnly authen-
ticate the freedom which they already enjoyed was resented by many as a severe
interference with their democratic freedom. Some had the impression that they
were "forced to be free."3 9
The Western Allies could have ordered the convocation of an assembly elected
by the population in their zones and assigned it the task of drafting and enacting
a constitution. But such a process would not have met the requirements of consti-
tution-making and its power to legitimize the existence and the authority of a
polity. Constitution-making demands the constituent power of a collective that
defines itself as a political entity and disposes of the institutional means to de-
velop and to express its own political will. In other words, constitution-making
37. However, whether these exceptions also apply to the right of self-determination is not fully clear. Cf
Goerg Ress, Article 107, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 8 (Bruno
Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
38. Which, as noted, had survived as a legal entity but was unable to form a collective will.
39. This is Rousseau's notorious and seemingly paradoxical statement from JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762). Note, however, that
Rousseau's contention was not paradoxical at all. He referred to a person who had agreed to enter the
social contract and committed himself to accept the burdens and the benefits of the contract, the essential
benefit being the freedom of the individual. Hence to force someone to be free was just a somewhat
pointed version of the truism that a contract into which I have entered voluntarily can be coercively
enforced against me.
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is an act of political se/f-determination. 40 While public international law did not
prevent the Allies from imposing their rule upon the German people, they could
not create the legal and political effects of a constituent power by their sovereign
fiat.
Perhaps the Western Allies were acknowledging the limits of their sover-
eignty when they finally abstained from pursuing their project of an imposed
German constituent assembly. In any case, a compromise was reached that estab-
lished a Parliamentary Council consisting of delegates elected by the West Ger-
man Lander. The Parliamentary Council represented the plurality of the
political forces of the peoples in the Lander - not of "the people" of the three
Western occupation zones, nor of "the people" of the new would-be West German
state, nor much less of "the German people" as it latently still existed in the per-
sisting "Germany as a whole" (a term which had replaced the German Reich).
The Parliamentary Council (composed of political party representatives including
the two deputies of the Communist Party) wanted to maintain the unity of the
German nation, so they created the West German state under the name "Federal
Republic of Germany" as a transitory and intentionally short-lived political body
which was to serve as a stand-in and to act for the momentarily incapacitated
German nation (i.e. the people of the German Reich). This is also the main
reason why the Parliamentary Council did not call their creation a "constitution,"
but rather "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," which they did not
submit to plebiscitary approval. Thus, the majority of its members could accept
the "stain" that the Western Allies reserved the right to veto stipulations of the
draft document and to give their final authorization. It was only after this sanc-
tion through the sovereign that the draft constitution was submitted to the par-
liaments of the Lander for approval. Only the parliament of Bavaria refused to
consent, but that had no tangible consequences. Since the new entity was not
devised as a federation but as a federal state, 41 the unanimous consent of all
Lander was not required for the validation of the constitution. Having passed
this complex procedure, the Basic Law was solemnly proclaimed on May 23,
1949.
Was the Basic Law an imposed constitution? And if so, was the imposition
legally justified? By today's standard of the right to self-determination 42 it was
certainly imposed. Bearers of this right are not only ethnic minorities living in
an ethnically different state but also peoples who live on the territory of a state43
40. See PREUSS, supra note 3; Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some
Deliberations on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14 CARDozo L.
REV. 639, 639 (1993).
41. See generally MURRAY FoRsyvrN, UNIONS OF STATES: TfIE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFEDERA-
TION (1981).
42. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1;
U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, para. 1.
43. See Doehring, supra note 36, at 55-56.
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- this was the case with the Germans whose territory was conquered by the
Allies, but not annexed. In other words, they had not become the subjects of
another state. The right of self-determination includes the people's freedom to
decide on its form of government without external intervention. The Allies' in-
fluence on the content of the Basic Law and their right to authorize its enactment
by the Parliamentary Council restrained the Germans' freedom to decide about
the particular character of their government. This is of course not to say that this
restraint was illegal - as indicated above, the then valid international law did
not forbid the assumption of the supreme authority of the country and, conse-
quently, the establishment of a new political and administrative order for an
entity which was not supposed to be a fully sovereign state.
Apart from this somewhat formalistic account, there is a substantive crite-
rion to judge the role the Western Allies played in the making of the German
Basic Law. Democratically elected Germans drafted the Basic Law, it had been
approved by all but one Linder parliaments, and even the Bavarian Landtag
which refused consent did not want a completely different structure of the consti-
tution, merely a stronger federal setup. Moreover, the rules of the Basic Law
opened a range of democratic freedoms and provided instruments of democratic
self-determination which were by no means inferior to those afforded by the Wei-
mar constitution which had been created by the constituent power of the German
people. 44 Thus, the people of the Federal Republic of Germany were not forced to
live under rules which they rejected. The only "blemish" of the Basic Law was its
lack of plebiscitary sanction: No constituent assembly had been elected, nor had
the result of the deliberations of the Parliamentary Council been submitted to
plebiscitary approval. 45
National unity was the only issue where the political aspirations of the
Germans living in the Federal Republic collided with the (original) political pur-
poses of the Allies: Had the Allies forced them to create a new state and to accept
it as the final palladium of their political identity this would have been tanta-
mount to the imposition of a foreign political will. This, however, did not occur.
On the contrary, Western Allies accepted the formula of the preamble of the Basic
Law in which an explicit reference was made to the "German people" and its
constituent power. Moreover, the final article gave emphasis to the purely tran-
sitory character of the Federal Republic and its Basic Law.
When the Federal Republic became sovereign in May 1955, no political
force demanded a new constitution, opting instead for national unity in one Ger-
man national state as they did in 1949. But even after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the accession of the (formerly communist) German Democratic Republic to
the Federal Republic in October 1990, the constituent power of the now united
44. See CHRISTOPH Gusy, DIE WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG (1997); 4 E.R. HUBER, DEUTSCHE
VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE SEIT 1789 (1981).
45. See MERKL, supra note 9, at 55, 128-29, 176, 181.
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German people was invoked only by politically marginal groups in the two Ger-
man states. As a result, Germany lives under a constitution which was initiated
by occupation powers who assumed sovereign power over the German people and
devised for a non-sovereign political entity. The constitution was never ap-
proved by the constituent power of the German people, but is accepted as perfectly
legitimate by the great majority of the German people. In the German case, the
process of constitution-making seems to have inserted less legitimacy into the Ba-
sic Law than the crucial role of the constituent power in constitutional theory
presupposes. 46
Still, there is no reason to dismiss the significance of the process of constitu-
tion-making. Had the Allies insisted on their original project and forced the
(West) Germans to create a constitution through a constituent assembly and/or
plebiscitary approval in a referendum, the outcome could have been resented by
the Germans as a foreign project which lacked sufficient legitimacy. This could
have undermined the force of the constitution irrespective of its presumably ac-
ceptable substance. On the other hand, the proper process is only a necessary, not
a sufficient condition. A polity is likely to view a constitution as illegitimate if its
substantive stipulations do not fit in the context of that polity; after all, the con-
stitution is not, as some claim, a suicide pact. Even the most appropriate and
legitimacy-engendering process will ultimately not be strong enough to save a
constitution if its rules and principles do not satisfy the needs of the country. The
Weimar constitution is a sad example for this truth.
The reference to the Weimar constitution gives rise to an observation which
will eventually lead to the reflections in the third part of this essay. In many
instances the Basic Law has been drafted by its authors as an attempt to avoid
the mistakes and insufficiencies of the Weimar constitution, which they attributed
to be part of the cause of the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Thus, to give just a
few examples, they put the bill of fundamental rights on top of the Basic Law
and made it the binding normative guideline for the conduct of public authorities
on the federal, state, and local levels; they avoided even the least plebiscitary
elements which played a certain, if largely overestimated role in the Weimar
Republic; they loosened the dependency of the executive from the political will of
the parliament, making a vote of no confidence extremely difficult and thus es-
tablishing a strongly executive-biased system of government; and they eliminated
the possibility of the eradication of democracy through democratic means by estab-
lishing a so-called eternity clause (Article 79, paragraph 3) which excluded cer-
tain basic principles of the constitution from any kind of constitutional
46. Cf Introduction to T IiE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 2. For the German case see
Christoph M6Uers, We are (afraid oj9 the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism,
in TiIE PARADOX OF CONSTrivFIONALISM, supra note 2,
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amendment. More or less they established a type of "militant democracy," devised
and strongly recommended by Karl Loewenstein in the 1930s.4 7
Regardless of the Weimar constitution's failures, 48 the relevant point is that
the Basic Law was created by a long and protracted constitutional discourse over
the requirements of a modern constitution that would be able to meet the chal-
lenges of a new age - the age of mass democracy dealing with the severe socio-
economic conflicts of a class-cleaved society without abandoning the basic princi-
ples of constitutionalism that had been developed at the end of the 18th century.
In Germany this debate began before the end of World War I and the creation of
the Weimar constitution in 1919. It mushroomed after the establishment of the
Weimar Republic and was accompanied by an overall sense of deep political and
cultural crisis.49 In other words, the German constitutional discourse of the 20th
century was based upon a deep and painful experience and understanding of the
fragility and vulnerability of the civilizing capacity of constitutions to such a
degree, that the term "imposition" for the depiction of the involvement of the
three Western Allies in the creation of the Basic Law appears inappropriate in
the first place. The level of reflexivity about the risks of a failed constitution and
about the embeddedness of constitutions in suitable pre-constitutional contexts
was so high on both sides that it seems more fitting to describe the achievement of
the Basic Law as a mutual learning process.50
IV. PRECONDITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL CONSTITUTION MAKING
Looking at the contextual character of constitutions reveals the requisite
preconditions for constitutions to function as a means of civilizing the political
life of a country. Of course, it is impossible to give an exhaustive account. In
view of the increasing occurrence of weak and failing states, this discussion is
limited to two conditions which seem particularly relevant to this topic: the first
is statehood and secularization, and the second is ethnic and religious
homogeneity.
The German case was a unique historical occurrence, but also a link in a
chain of events which resulted in the transition from authoritarian rule to de-
mocracy. These transitions include the wave of democratization after World War
II (Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria), followed by the regime changes in the Medi-
47. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. Sci. REV 417
(1937); Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. PoL. Sci. REV
638 (1937).
48. Cf CHRISTPOPH Gusy, WEIMAR - DIE WEHRLOSE REPUBLIK? VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZRECHT UND
VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ IN DERWEIMARER REPUBLIK (1991); EIMARS LANCE SCHATTEN -"WEIMAR"
ALs ARGUMENT NACH 1945 (Christoph Gusy ed., 2003).
49. See Jacobson & Schlink, supra note 34.
50. This dimension of constitution-making has been introduced by Andrew Arato, Constitutional Learning,
52 THEORIA 1 (2005); see also PREUSS, supra note 3.
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terranean area and in Latin America between 1974 to 1985 (Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina), and the transformation of Central and
Eastern European countries from communist rule to some kind of constitutional-
ism.5 ' These experiences caused quite different, country-specific patterns of con-
stitutionalization. All of them assumed that the receiving countries kept certain
basic institutional and cultural conditions which somehow were attuned to con-
stitutionalism. This assumption has become doubtful. The contemporary debates
about importing or imposing constitutions deal with countries which have only a
weak if any constitutional history. This applies to most of the Arabic nations.
The compatibility of their political culture with constitutionalism is doubtful at
best. This matter should be further researched and explored using cultural and
area studies. Scholars of constitutionalism can contribute to this research by ana-
lyzing the pre-constitutional conditions of constitutionalism. Is the idea of consti-
tutionalism less universal than its essential message suggests? Two elements
appear particularly problematic in this respect.
A. Statehood and Secularization
The history of modern constitutionalism is strongly connected with the de-
velopment of statehood, its bureaucracy, territorial character, policing and mili-
tary, diplomatic capabilities, etc. 52 After all, constitutionalism was an important
tool of rationalizing state power.53 Although the modem state originates in the
European history and culture, 54 it has become the universal political form of the
20th century. Its essential elements - territoriality, sovereignty, coercive control
of the population living within the boundaries of the territory55 - do not seem
overly demanding and hence are conducive to every geographical and cultural
environment. In an age when weak and failed states come ever more to the
surface56 this assumption is no longer certain.5 7
51. See ELSTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 4 (describing the several waves of democratization); Renske
Doorenspleet, Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization, 52 W~bRLD POL. 384, 384-406
(2000).
52. See, e.g., CAR1. J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (Blaisdell Publ'g Co. 1968) (1937); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL
STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE: STUDIES IN POLITICAL, DEVELOPMENT (Charles Tilly ed., 1975); MARTIN
VAN CREvALD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE (1999); WOLFGANG REINHARD, GESCHICHTE
DER STAATSGEWALT- EINE VERGLEICHENDE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE EUROPAS VON DEN ANFANGEN
BIS ZUR GEGENWART (1999).
53. DIETER GRIMM, DER VERFASSUNGSBEGRIFF IN HISTORISCHER ENTWICKLUNG: DIE ZUKUNFT DER
VERFASSUNG 101-55 (1991).
54. GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 34 (1990).
55. See id. at 19. See also the famous juristic definition of GEORG JELLINEK, ALLOEMEINE STAATSLEHRE
183, 394 (Darmstadt 3d ed. 1960) (1900).
56. See ROBERT I. ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL.: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2004).
57. For the prospects of statehood in the extra-European world see REINHARD, supra note 52, at 480.
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If we look at the post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe
including Russia, we realize that the institutional devices of a modern constitu-
tional state have been established. This holds true for those countries which, on
May 1, 2004, acceded to the European Union; this was only possible after a
difficult process of assimilating to the economic and political structures of the Eu-
ropean Union, laid down in the "Copenhagen Criteria" of the Treaty on the
European Union. 58 However, what is prevailing in some countries, Poland for
example,5 9 is a deep disappointment with the new political system's capacity to
cope with the economic and social problems of an order which they had passion-
ately yearned for under communist rule. Indeed, in these countries the life situa-
tions of many ordinary people have dramatically deteriorated under the auspices
of the new political order. What is even more serious is that the new political
structures of the constitutional state rarely generate the degree of political stabil-
ity which seems necessary for the reconstruction of the economy, particularly for
attracting foreign investors. Evidently, the formal institutions of the constitu-
tional state are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for satisfactory state
functioning. If this holds true, the question arises as to which additional precon-
ditions are required for the smooth operation of the constitutional state.
There is one requirement which is for the most part undisputed, namely the
constitutional state must be a state in the modern sense of this term. It must be a
political organization which monopolizes the authority to wield legitimate coer-
cion, including physical force, thus placing all individuals equally under its
power, outlawing any kind of self-help or self-justice and prohibiting any kind of
intermediary force which could either claim loyalty from its members, or accumu-
late so much power that it could become a competitor to the state. Max Weber
established the classical definition for the modern state as "a compulsory organi-
zation with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as
legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it,"60
and, elsewhere today, "legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state."61
There is good reason to highlight the state's monopoly of legal coercion. To-
day we experience a serious malfunction of constitutions whenever this require-
ment is not satisfied. The aforementioned category of failed states which has
become a major problem of international pofitics 62 is unequivocal evidence for the
renaissance of a phenomenon of the past, namely unconsolidated statehood. This
results in unsettled disputes about territorial boundaries, about nationality and
58. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 49, O.J. C 325/5, at 31 (2002), 37 I.L.M.
67, at 78 (ex Article 0).
59. Let alone those which have not (yet) joined the European Union or will not be able to join it.
60. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of California
Press 1978) (1968).
61. Id. at 314.
62. See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW & OLD WARS: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA (1999).
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citizenship, and about the principles and forms of government, including the
struggle about who is entitled to rule. The formation of the modern state in
Western Europe - its territorial basis, its monopoly of legal coercion, its compul-
sory jurisdiction about all actions taking place in the boundaries of its territory,
and its continuous operation - was the result of long and cruel religious and
civil wars in the 16th and 17th centuries in which the different religious denomi-
nations, churches, and sects not only struggled for the right religious doctrine, but
for the imposition of their respective religious truths upon all members of the
society. The connection of religious truth with political authority was one of the
inexhaustible sources for civil war in 16th- and 17th-centuries-Europe.
In the history of political ideas it was obviously Thomas Hobbes' concept of a
political order which provided a way out of the never-ending struggle for relig-
ious truth and metaphysical certainty. For him, the inherent rationale of a good
polity consisted in its capacity to preserve peace and to prevent civil war. Satis-
fying the basic human need for physical security and lessening fear of a violent
death was more important than the concern for eternal life and salvation which
had dominated political reasoning during the Christian period of European his-
tory.63 In other words, Hobbes removed religion as a source for rules about the
character of a polity and thus opened a new area of reasoning about the appropri-
ate structure of the polity - one may call this the sociological turn in the justifi-
cation of political rule.
The concept of sovereign state power and the state's monopoly of legitimate
coercion, then, is the immediate result of a secular justification of the polity. It
resulted from the emergence of a world that lost its common religious fundaments
and the economic basis of the feudal communal life as well. The European world
of the 17th century fell apart, and the universalism of the Catholic world was
replaced by the plurality of subjective world views of individuals, groups, sects,
new social entities, etc. How could one conceive of an order which was able to
bind the individuals together, i.e. which was able to prevent civil war among
them, without imposing on them a common social and cultural form of life which
had lost its cohesive force?
This predicament of the European world of the 17th century was the start-
ing point for the career of a completely new theoretical paradigm, namely the
paradigm of interest. As Albert 0. Hirschman has thoroughly analyzed, 64 the
rationality, calculability and hence predictability of the interest - as opposed to
the irrationality and unpredictability of the passions - became the key concept
for understanding the world and the legitimation of individuals' actions since the
17th century. To struggle for wealth, which had been disqualified as a sin by the
Catholic church for centuries, now received an increasingly positive coloring, un-
63. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104-09 (Bobbs-Merri Educ. Publ'g 1978) (1651).
64. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPI-
TALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1978).
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til, finally, it was praised as a virtue. The most drastic theorist of the interest as
the basis of all social actions was of course Thomas Hobbes, for whom the interest
of the individual in his or her self-preservation was the only valid criterion for
the legitimacy of his or her actions. Consequently, he became the most radical
advocate of the sovereignty of the state and its monopoly of legitimate coercion.
For him the undisputed authority of the state to keep peace and order was the
only means to satisfy the individuals' interest in their self-preservation. In order
to fulfill this task, the sovereign even had the right to determine the religious and
the epistemological truth which his subjects had to believe in because, in Hobbes'
view, it was primarily the quarrel about the right religion which had led the
people to argue and fight with each other, and ultimately to violate peace and
order and engage in civil war.65
In a nutshell, the genesis of the modern state, its monopoly of legitimate
coercion, and its legitimation as an order which is specialized in the maintenance
of peace and order in the external world is due to a process of secularization. 66
Perhaps it is more correct to speak of a process of continuous domestication of the
religious energies of the European societies since the 17th century. In the perspec-
tive of political and constitutional theory, the relations between church and state
were, of course, particularly important. There have been different answers to
this problem - reaching from the concept of a state church, predominant in Ger-
many until the 19th century and still valid in contemporary England, up to the
most radical separation of church and state in the establishment clause of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution - all of which are anxious to safeguard the
integrity of a sphere of politics, civil liberty and political obligation where the
commands of the church have no legally binding character. Given the plurality of
religious and value orientations in modern societies it is not surprising that the
injection of particularly religious commands into the secular legal order - for
example the prohibition of divorce, the unconditional prohibition of abortion, or
the denial of equal rights to women - normally tends to weaken the binding
character of the legal order. Its strength and legitimacy rests on the strict separa-
tion of morality and legality, and this implies that it does not make any claim on
the moral or religious beliefs of its citizens.
B. Ethnic and Religious Homogeneity as Preconditions of the
Constitutional State?
This last issue leads to a second condition which seems indispensable to the
viability of a constitutional order. This is the capacity of a society to cope with its
internal conflicts without resorting to civil war. Of course, one may say that a
65. See HOBBES, supra note 63, at 147.
66. See HERBERT KROGER, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 32 (1964); A.D. LINDSAY, THE MODERN DEMO-
CRATIC STATE 64-65 (1947); Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang
der Sdikularisation, in STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT 92 (1967).
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main feature of constitutions is that they preclude civil war and society's relapse
into an uncivilized mode of existence, i.e. a Hobbesian state of nature. However,
the fate of the Weimar constitution clearly displays that sometimes a constitution
is not strong enough to stand firm against the power of forces which are hostile
against its intellectual and moral foundations. Constitutions are about proper
institutions which guarantee a sphere of free, spontaneous, and autonomous in-
teractions among the members of what we call civil society, and about the proce-
dures through which civil society is able to constitute itself as a polity and to
develop a collective will. These two pillars of modern constitutionalism presup-
pose that neither civil society nor the polity are homogeneous consensus-based
social entities, but rather consist of individuals pursuing a plurality of competing,
mutually exclusive values and interests which have to be harmonized. In other
words, constitutions are institutional devices which aim at making compatible
the economic, social, and cultural plurality of a "society of individuals."67 This
entails that they are specialized in coping with conflicts arising among members
of the society, related to various issues, ranging from the proper delineation of
boundaries in the political vis-a-vis the sphere of civil society through the princi-
ples of social justice, to the definition of guidelines for collective action like the
"national interest." They are conflicts about what it means to live together, in
one polity, under a constitution.
Paradoxically it is this permanent struggle for the definition of the common
good which generates a spirit of community in a society of individuals - at least
this is the assumption of authors who claim that conflicts have a positive effect
upon the social coherence of societies.68 In a critical analysis of this time-honored
line of argument in the social sciences, Albert 0. Hirschman offers an important
qualification which is relevant to this article. In his view, not all conflicts fur-
ther coherence in all kinds of societies; rather, he claims, social conflicts have only
positive effects in democratic market societies, and even this may be true only for
a certain genre of conflicts. In developing his argument he writes:
Many conflicts of market society are over the distribution of the social
product among different classes, sectors, or regions. Highly varied
though they are, they tend to be divisible; they are conflicts over getting
more or less, in contrast to conflicts of the either-or, nondivisible cate-
gory that are characteristic of societies split along rival ethnic, linguis-
tic, or religious lines. Nondivisible conflicts have recently also become
more prominent in the older democracies and particularly in the United
67. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE SOCIETY OF INDIVIDUALS 3-66 (Michael Schr6ter ed., Edmund Jephcott
trans., 1991).
68. For an overview of the literature see Albert 0. Hirschman, Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic
Market Societies, in A PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 231, 236 (1995).
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States, as a result of the importance assumed by such issues as abortion
and by problems arising out of multiculturalism. 69
Hirschman's reference to the United States - the oldest constitutional state -
gives rise to the question of whether any attempt to import a constitution into a
conflicted country is doomed to failure. Here, again, it seems appropriate to re-
mind us that the idea of homogeneity has frequently been invoked as a necessary
element of the modern constitutional state - authors of the liberal and left spec-
trum tended to emphasize socio-economic homogeneity,70 while in the more con-
servative field the idea of national, ethnic, or religious homogeneity prevailed. 71
Today it is the latter dimension of homogeneity which arouses concern because it
refers to national, ethnic, and religious conflicts which appear irreconcilable in
many regions of the world and which in several cases have assumed the character
of international crisis (e.g. conflicts in Congo, Sri Lanka, or Chechnya). What
comes to the fore in these conflicts is the quest for commonness, or sameness as the
pre-political foundation of a polity. As stated above, in Europe the religious
conflict between the several Christian confessions, denominations, and sects was
domesticated by the establishment of sovereign statehood, and in the United
States the separation of religion and politics has become one of the fundamentals
of its constitutional system. 72 Thus, religion has never been a viable candidate as
a pre-constitutional groundwork of the constitutional state.
But something like a secular religion has had an important influence at least
upon the European version of the constitutional state, namely the nation. In its
historical development over the last two-hundred years, nationality, or na-
tionhood, has turned out to be the most vigorous concept of commonness. Max
Weber's observations on the constitutive character of nationality and ethnicity for
the self-understanding of political communities are surprisingly up-to-date. But
he, too, fails to fully explain the predominant "connotation that whatever is felt
to be distinctively common must derive from common descent," although, as he
notes, in reality "persons who consider themselves members of the same national-
ity are often much less related by common descent than are persons belonging to
different and hostile nationalities."73 From this point of view, nationhood or
nationality constitutes an antecedant community which appears able to create
that kind of commonness and pre-political social solidarity required for the func-
tioning of a polity based upon a society of individuals.
69. Id. at 244.
70. See OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED ESSAYS 40 (1969).
71. See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 9 (1985).
72. See HAROLD JOSEPH BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION
221-35 (1993).
73. See WEBER, supra note 60, at 395.
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Note, however, that since the end of the 18th century two different concepts
of nation have been competing for recognition. On the one hand, there is the
French concept of nation according to which, in the famous words of the Abbe
Siey~s, a nation is "[a] body of associates living under common laws and are
represented by the same legislative assembly."74 In this understanding, the na-
tion is constituted by the entirety of the denizens of a particular territory who, by
the very act of forming a political entity and of being subject to common laws,
acquire the status of citizenship and constitute the demos. 75 This political concept
of nation diverges significantly from a concept that has been prevailing in Ger-
many and in Eastern Europe since the end of the 18th century: the nation as a
pre-political community constituted by the commonness of such ascriptive proper-
ties as origin, race, language, religion, culture, history, and the like. Here the
nation is not the demos, but the ethnos.76 It is this ethnic definition of na-
tionhood which is an almost insurmountable obstacle to the inclusion of individu-
als in the nation who do not meet the terms of ethnicity as defined by the group
which dominates the country. Ethnic plurality is largely regarded as spoiling the
integrity of the political community - the end goal being ethnic identity and
authenticity. The ultimate criterion of justice is not the universalist standard of
what is right for all human beings, but what is good "for us." Hence pluralist
democracy which represents the universalist values of modern constitutionalism is
barely compatible with political forces which aspire to an ethnically homogeneous
polity.
A further aspect of constitutionalism seems relevant here. One of the core
principles of constitutionalism is the limitation of political power. 77 This is co-
herent with the idea of an autonomous civil society which, due to its inherent
plurality of ideas and interests, develops a high degree of creativity and innova-
tion which is a driving force of the idea of progress associated with the idea of
constitutionalism. 78 This is difficult to reconcile with ethnic identity as a pivotal
idea of a polity. In fact, as Weber wrote in view of the conflicts within the mul-
tinational empire of the Hapsburgs:
[T]he concept "nation" directs us to political power. Hence, the concept
seems to refer... to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea
of a powerful political community of people who share a common lan-
guage, or religion, or common customs, or political memories; such a
74. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYtS,WHAT IS THE THIRD ESrATE? 58 (S.E. Finer ed., M. Blondel trans., Fred-
erick A. Praeger 1963) (1789).
75. See ERIC J. HOBSRAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REAILITY
14-45 (1990).
76. See E.K. FRANCIS, INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: AN ESSAY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43-115 (1976).
77. See KARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVFRNMENT: A COMPARISON (1974); ANDR.S SAJO, LIm-
ITIN(; GoVER.NMNI: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITJTIONALISM (1999).
78. See PREJSS, supra note 3.
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state may already exist or it may be desired. The more power is em-
phasized, the closer appears to be the link between nation and state.
This pathetic pride in the power of one's own community, or this long-
ing for it, may be much more widespread in relatively small language
groups such as the Hungarians, Czechs or Greeks than in a similar but
much larger community such as the Germans 150 years ago . . .79
Perhaps Weber's observation is still valid today. The Balkan Wars of the
1990s come to mind. There are indications today that the pride of the power of
one's own community also feeds the idea of an ethnic understanding of the nation
and vice versa. If this hypothesis holds true it would mean that implanting con-
stitutions in divided societies, in which the groups struggling for power define
their vision of a good polity in ethnic terms, appears to be a particularly difficult
if not entirely fruitless undertaking. Constitutionalism requires a polity whose
members are citizens, not brothers/sisters or otherwise bound together by pre-
political and pre-legal "ascriptive" attributes, who are aliens to each other and yet
are able to recognize each others as equals.80
A final remark as to the issue of religion. As stated above, in the Western
tradition of constitutionalism, religion was not a serious candidate for forming
the pre-political community of the constitutional state because modern statehood
rested upon the political and legal isolation of religion from politics. Here a qual-
ification seems appropriate. Today we observe signs of a renaissance of conflicts
between religion and politics on a worldwide level. Against many predictions,
religious conflicts are not restricted to premodern societies;8 1 they cannot be un-
derstood as pure modernization conflicts, they are also conflicts of modern socie-
ties. Also, in the secularized world of today, religious issues create deep political
tensions in many constitutional states. After all, Northern Ireland has been liv-
ing on the verge of a religious civil war for over twenty-five years. There are
other cases of deep politico-religious tensions which need political accommodation
and constitutional solution, for instance the recent French debate (and legisla-
tion!) about the right of Muslim women to wear the scarf in public institutions
(like schools or universities), a debate which in a different version has also
reached Germany.8 2 Other examples of political and, consequently, constitutional
disputes in advanced modern societies are the well-known battles in Germany
79. VEBER, supra note 60, at 398.
80. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004); PETER
RIESENBERG, CITIZENSHIP IN THE WESTERN TRADITION: PLATO TO ROUSSFAU (1992); Ulrich K.
Preuss, Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of a Political Theory of Citizenship, in DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUrIONAL CULTURE IN THE UNION OF EUROPE 107 (Richard Bellamy et al. eds., 1995).
81. See generally Peter Beyer, Globalizing Systems, Global Cultural Models and Religion(s), 13 INTL
Soc. 79 (1998); Ronald Inglehart &Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Per-
sistence of Traditional Values, 65 AM. Soc. REV. 19 (2000),
82. See the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003,
108 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 282 (F.R.G.), available at http://
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and in the United States, respectively, about school prayers, about displaying re-
ligious symbols like the crucifix in public schools, or about religious instruction.
Until the middle of the 20th century, constitutionalism was mainly a Euro-
Atlantic concept and political practice, and therefore constitutionalism dealt pri-
marily with the conflicts which resulted from the confessional splits within Chris-
tianity. Two major developments have changed this situation. First,
Christianity no longer defines the framework of religious conflicts, not even in
traditionally Christian European and U.S. societies. They have undergone
profound transformations to multiethnic, multireligious, and multicultural socie-
ties which comprise communities of all major world religions including the in-
creasing group of atheists. Second, constitutionalism is no longer an exclusively
Euro-Atlantic concept. At the end of the 20th century constitutionalism has be-
come a universal yardstick for civilized governance. Yet the assumption that the
Euro-Atlantic experience with the role of constitutionalism in the containment of
religious conflicts may serve as a model for other regions is obviously premature.
As stated above, the Euro-Atlantic experience was restricted to the confessional
conflicts within Christianity;, it has been ignorant with respect to conflicts be-
tween different religions. There were no Muslim communities in the early mod-
ern world of Europe which engendered constitutionalism, much less other non-
Christian religious communities with the exception of the Jews. But the members
of this religious minority were almost everywhere victims of persecution or severe
discrimination despite the principle of toleration which eventually developed into
the constitutional right to religious freedom. 83 Thus, the tradition of constitu-
tionalism - Euro-Atlantic in essence - does not provide answers for the relig-
ious conflicts of the 21st century. In view of the aforementioned difficulties of the
multireligious and multicultural Western societies to cope with their present-day
problems of integrating religious energies into their concept of governance, it is
questionable whether they are in the position to offer convincing solutions for
other regions of the world which are deeply divided on religious issues.
This does not mean, of course, that deeply divided societies cannot learn from
the Euro-Atlantic constitutional experience. Nor should we dismiss projects of
constitutionalizing conflict-ridden societies as intrinsically futile. There are ap-
proaches to establishing post-conflict constitutionalism which seem more promis-
ing than a mere imposition of constitutions after a coerced regime change.
Post-World War II Europe is an example for rising above never-ending and
bloody conflicts of the past through the creation of new forms of interdependency
among the former enemies. The European Union of today, having evolved from
the incipient European Economic Community of 1957, has become the most ad-
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924 2bvr143602.html (German), http://www.bverfg.de/entsch
eidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602en.htrrl (English).
83. PEREZ ZAGORIN, How THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE WEST 7-13, 54, 293
(2003).
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
vanced model of mutual interdependence of nation-states. This has generated a
new type of composite constitution in which the legal orders of the supranational
European Union and of the member states complement each other to the effect
that none of them can claim the status of autonomy.8 4 There are indications that
the involvement of external actors may become a general pattern of constitution-
making world wide.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UPON THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT-RIDDEN SOCIETIES -
INTERNATIONAL "CONSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION"
The international community has increased its role in the creation of consti-
tutions, especially in fragile states. The analysis of the structures of governance
in the 21st century can no longer presuppose the time-honored distinction be-
tween inside and outside the state, that is, clear-cut boundaries between the na-
tional and the international spheres. Both the spheres of sovereign statehood and
of inter-state relations have lost their distinct characteristics and have undergone
a process of profound transformation. This process is, to put it succinctly, an
evolution from a "pluriverse-of-states order" into what one might call, para-
phrasing Ulrich Beck, a "transnational cooperative order." 5 The former, for-
mally recognized in the Peace Treaties of Westphalia, was a design of spatial
differentiation of the politically relevant parts of the globe into a pluriversum of
sovereign states. This new spatial order became the model for the social and
political organization of the modern world, in that it created and established new
patterns of interaction and spatial ontologies.8 6 The most important was, of
course, the distinction between inside/outside,8 7 making boundaries between ter-
ritories "meaningful dividers between social, economic, and cultural systems."'S
Obviously, today this spatial order no longer exists. The porosity of state
boundaries, the diminished relevance of state territory, and the decreasing control
of the states' authority over the life world of their population have created a
global space in which the decision-making power is no longer distributed along
the lines of state borders. In the developing world of globalization new modes of
governance have emerged. In the international sphere they include policy-net-
84. Ingolf Pernice, Multi-Level Constitutionalism in the European Union, 27 EUR. L. REV. 511 (2002);
Ulrich K. Preuss, Prospects of a Constitution for Europe, 3 CONSTELLATIONS 209 (1996); J.H.H.
Weiler, On the Power of the Word. Europe's Constitutional Iconography, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 173,
176 (2005).
85. ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? 133, 135 (2000).
86. ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY (1986).
87. R.BJ. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY (1993).
88. Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political- Territorial Ideal- Historical and
Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 81, 90 (Thomas J.
Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
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works of state agencies, NGOs, transnational corporations, law firms, and inter-
national organizations, as well as multi-level arrangements of governance using
complex methods of cooperation and consociational procedures at different geo-
graphical and functional levels. s9 The states' autonomy and their claim to mo-
nopolize the power and the authority to determine the character and the quality
of public goods for their polities have greatly decreased, as they have become en-
tangled in those tight networks of public goods production.
Unsurprisingly this has also had considerable effects upon the role of consti-
tutions. No longer can we regard them as purely domestic instruments of gov-
ernment of a nation-bound population which exercises its right to national self-
determination without concern of its regional or global surroundings. Even in
the United States, the seemingly most self-sufficient global power, a vivid debate
has developed about the question of whether the courts are allowed to refer to
foreign law when they adjudicate a national case.9° There are other states which
are much more exposed to external influence than the United States. Obviously I
refer to the increasing number of states which simply do not dispose of the indis-
pensable institutional requirements of statehood, the most important being undis-
puted territorial boundaries, the state's monopoly of coercive power, and a
minimal apparatus of law enforcement built upon basic forms of the rule of law.
This sad predicament is usually the consequence of unresolved domestic conflicts
frequently triggering civil war. It is this category of the above-mentioned failed
states which is highly dependent upon the support of the international commu-
nity. While, of course, the aid of material goods like food, health care, and basic
physical infrastructure are of utmost importance, good internal governance is at
least as important for the sustainable development of those countries.
The relationship between a country's commitment to the rule of law and the
respect of human rights and its material welfare, has been convincingly shown by
the research of economists, most prominently by Amartya Sen.91 Similarly, the
then Secretary-General of the U.N., Boutros-Ghali, in his June 17, 1992 report
to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace, drew his audience's attention to the
"obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and
transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and secur-
ity in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need
to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communi-
89. See the selection of an abundant literature in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2003); GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Eleonore Kofman & Gillian
Youngs eds., 2d ed. 2003).
90. I refer to the debate following Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
91. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, POVERl-Y AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION
(Oxford University Press 1983) (1981).
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ties." 92 He urged the leaders of States "to find a balance between the needs of
good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent
world." 93 Although the Agenda for Peace does not explicitly mention the issues
of state-building and constitution-making, it certainly became an important
founding document for the several activities of the U.N. in this area of interna-
tional politics. 94
Thus, the concern for the constitutional character of a country has become an
important element of international politics. Recently Daniel Thtirer, the Swiss
scholar of public international law, has explored the international influence upon
national processes of constitution-making and discovered different roles of the
international community which includes manifold non-state actors. These modes
of involvement in the constitutional affairs of a country range from initiating
through accompanying and steering, to the instatement of such processes. 95 We
may call this kind of international aid "constitutional intervention," using the
analogy to the established term "humanitarian intervention." To be sure, while
the latter includes military means, the former is thoroughly civil in character.
An embryonic form of this type of U.N. "intervention" dates back to 1984
when the U.N. Security Council closely watched the constitutional development of
South Africa and its apartheid system. In its Resolution 554 (Aug. 17, 1984) it
declared the "new" constitution which the regime had enacted in 1983 "as null
and void." This resolution was a precursor of a development which, after the end
of the Cold War and the emergence of thoroughly new constellations in interna-
tional politics, became a pattern of international governance. Although taking
account of the specific character of the conflicts and of their underlying conditions
in the relevant countries, the general line of action of the U.N. is the establish-
ment of an International Interim Authority (occasionally under the authority of
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter), the explicit recognition of the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the relevant country,
and the appeal to all parties involved in the conflict to cooperate with the Interim
Authority with the aim to reach a reconciliatory settlement.96
92. The Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping, 59, delivered to the Members of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (June
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article reflects some of the complexities of "constitutional intervention-
ism." It tries to sharpen the awareness of how difficult it is to import constitu-
tions into regions where constitutionalism is a minor element of the political
culture at best. The main reason why the importation, much less the imposition,
of constitutions in the course of coerced regime change is likely to fail is the fact
that the authority of constitutions rests largely upon the legitimacy of the
processes through which they are generated; substance, although of course impor-
tant, plays a secondary role. The case of post-World War II Germany, which has
been analyzed at some length, is an example of the significance of involving the
local population in the process of constitution-making, even if this population acts
in the shadow of the sovereign of a conquering military power. Besides the ap-
propriateness of the process of constitution-making in terms of a fair involvement
of the people, there are demanding requirements which have to be met in order
that a constitution can flourish. In this essay two of them are addressed, namely
the prerequisite of statehood, based upon a secular justification of its monopoly of
coercive power, and the domestication of "categorical conflicts," 97 ethnic and relig-
ious dashes being the most divisive ones. In view of these requirements, the
project of importing constitutions by way of regime change appears quite un-
promising. Still, there is the need to assist conflict-ridden and failing states in
regaining civilized forms of governance. The article gives a brief account of the
constitutionalization of collapsed, or in danger of collapsing, states through inter-
national action (largely under the control of the U.N. Security Council). This
international involvement in intra-state constitution-making is regarded as an
emerging pattern of connecting domestic governance of states with the interna-
tional and transnational space characteristic of a globalizing world of overlap-
ping jurisdictions and increasingly permeable state borders.
Constitution-making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, in 10 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 423 (Armin von Bogdandy & Rfudiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
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